Introduction

Why getting PEP identification right matters

Of all the customer risk categories in AML compliance, Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) are among the most consequential, and most misunderstood. Get the identification wrong in one direction and you fail to apply required Enhanced Due Diligence, exposing your firm to regulatory action. Get it wrong in the other direction and you over-screen ordinary customers, damaging relationships and creating operational burden.

The FCA's 2024 multi-firm review found room for improvement in every firm it examined in detail: both under-identification of genuine PEPs and over-identification of individuals who did not meet the threshold. This guide cuts through the complexity.

US$20B to US$40B
Imprecise 2007 estimate of annual corrupt money linked to public officials in developing and transition countries
900K+
PEPs in global databases
12+
Months PEP status continues after leaving office
FG25/3
FCA's latest PEP guidance (July 2025)
πŸ†•
July 2025: FCA PEP Guidance FG25/3
The FCA published revised PEP guidance FG25/3 in July 2025 following a statutory review of the MLR 2017 domestic PEP provisions. This guidance significantly clarifies who is, and who is NOT, a PEP in the UK context, reducing the burden on domestic PEPs while maintaining rigour for high-risk cases. This guide incorporates FG25/3 throughout.
Section 01

The FATF definition: where it all starts

The concept of the Politically Exposed Person was formalised by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its 2003 revision of the 40 Recommendations. The FATF definition, adopted into UK law via MLR 2017, defines a PEP as:

πŸ“–
FATF / MLR 2017 Definition
An individual who is, or has been, entrusted with a prominent public function: including heads of state or government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state-owned corporations, and important political party officials.

The key phrase is "entrusted with a prominent public function." This is the test. The rationale is straightforward: individuals in positions of public power have both the opportunity and, in some cases, the motivation to misuse that power for personal financial gain, through bribery, corruption, embezzlement of public funds, or abuse of their position to benefit associates.

It is important to be clear about what PEP status is not: it is not an accusation of wrongdoing. Being identified as a PEP is a risk indicator, not a finding of guilt. The vast majority of PEPs are entirely legitimate individuals who happen to hold (or have held) public positions. The obligation is to apply additional scrutiny, not to refuse business.

"PEP status is a risk flag, not a criminal finding. The obligation is enhanced diligence, not automatic refusal."
Section 02

PEP categories: who qualifies

MLR 2017 Regulation 35(12)(a) provides the core definition of a PEP. Regulation 35(14) supplements that definition with a non exhaustive statutory list of eight types of prominent public function. FATF standards and FCA guidance provide further interpretation and practical scoping of those statutory categories.

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Heads of State & Government
Presidents, Prime Ministers, monarchs, chancellors, and deputy or assistant ministers. Always foreign PEPs when non-UK.
πŸ›οΈ
Members of Parliament / Legislative Bodies
MPs and equivalent members of national legislatures. UK MPs are domestic PEPs under this category.
πŸ—³οΈ
Governing Bodies of Political Parties
Senior officials of political parties at national level, distinct from elected legislators themselves.
βš–οΈ
Senior Judicial Officials
Supreme Court justices, constitutional court judges, and members of judicial bodies whose decisions are not subject to further appeal except in exceptional circumstances.
🏦
Courts of Auditors & Central Bank Boards
Members of national courts of auditors and governing boards of central banks. Frequently overlooked category.
πŸŽ–οΈ
Ambassadors & Senior Armed Forces Officers
Ambassadors, chargΓ©s d'affaires, and high-ranking officers in the armed forces. Senior rank required, junior officers do not qualify.
🏒
State-Owned Enterprise Executives
Members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of state-owned enterprises, particularly in high-risk sectors like energy, telecoms, and defence.
🌐
International Organisation Officials
Directors, deputy directors, and board members of international organisations. UN Secretary-General, IMF Managing Director, World Bank President, NATO Secretary General.

The "senior" threshold: where the line is drawn

Several categories require the individual to hold a "senior" position. MLR 2017 does not define "senior" numerically: it is a judgement call based on the prominence of the public function and the degree of power and influence it carries. The FCA's FG25/3 guidance provides important clarification on where the line falls for UK domestic positions (see Section 07 below).

The general principle: the more influence over public funds, public policy, or regulatory decisions, the more likely a position qualifies. A permanent secretary at a major UK government department qualifies; a mid-grade civil servant in the same department does not.

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Section 03

Domestic vs foreign PEPs: a critical distinction

One of the most important distinctions in PEP compliance, and one that changed significantly with FG25/3, is between domestic and foreign PEPs. The risk profile is materially different, and so are the compliance obligations.

πŸ”΄ Highest risk
Foreign PEPs
Politicians and officials from foreign states. EDD is always required regardless of assessed risk level. FATF Recommendation 12 mandates this. No exceptions.
🟑 Lower risk
UK Domestic PEPs
UK politicians and officials. Under FG25/3, generally lower risk than foreign PEPs. EDD required only where specific risk factors elevate the risk.
🟒 Medium risk
International Org PEPs
Officials of international bodies. Risk-based approach applies. Generally treated similarly to domestic PEPs under FG25/3.

Why are foreign PEPs higher risk?

The elevated risk of foreign PEPs reflects several factors that do not apply, or apply less strongly, to domestic PEPs:

  • Weaker rule of law: in many countries, the legal and institutional constraints on political corruption are weaker than in the UK
  • Less transparency: beneficial ownership, asset declarations, and public accountability mechanisms are less developed in many jurisdictions
  • Cross-border complexity: funds from foreign corruption are often deliberately moved across jurisdictions to obscure their origin
  • Enforcement asymmetry: UK law enforcement has less visibility into the conduct of foreign officials than domestic ones
  • Historical evidence: the majority of high-profile PEP-related money laundering cases have involved foreign officials laundering proceeds in the UK financial system
πŸ“‹ Case study Teodorin Obiang: Equatorial Guinea

Teodorin Obiang, son of the President of Equatorial Guinea and himself a government minister, allegedly laundered hundreds of millions of dollars through US, French, and UK financial institutions. His spending included a $38.5 million Gulfstream jet and a $30 million Malibu mansion, purchased despite an official government salary under $100,000 a year against which he amassed over $100 million in assets.

Multiple financial institutions processed transactions for Obiang without applying adequate EDD, failing to identify the obvious inconsistency between his official salary and his expenditure.

Lesson: Source of wealth must be genuinely scrutinised for foreign PEPs. Expenditure patterns inconsistent with official income are a primary red flag that EDD must address.
🧠 Knowledge check
Under FATF Recommendation 12 and MLR 2017, when is Enhanced Due Diligence mandatory for a foreign PEP?
Section 04

Relatives and Close Associates (RCAs)

PEP obligations do not stop with the PEP themselves. Under MLR 2017 Regulation 35(1), firms must also determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a family member or known close associate of a PEP (RCA), and Regulation 35(5) then requires EDD measures for that relationship. Regulation 35(12) supplies the definitions of "family member" and "known close associate" used throughout, it does not itself create the identification or EDD duty.

Who is a family member of a PEP?

  • Spouse or civil partner
  • Children and their spouses or civil partners
  • Parents

Who is a "known close associate"?

A known close associate is an individual who is known to have joint beneficial ownership of legal entities or legal arrangements with a PEP, or who has any other close business or personal relationship with the PEP. This includes:

  • Business partners with joint ownership or control
  • Individuals with a joint bank account or investment portfolio
  • Individuals who are sole beneficial owners of entities known to be set up for the benefit of a PEP
⚠️
The "known" qualifier matters
The obligation applies to "known" close associates: you are not required to conduct exhaustive investigations to discover unknown relationships. However, if information comes to light during CDD that suggests a close associate relationship, you must act on it. The FCA expects reasonable steps to identify RCAs, not willful blindness.

Why RCAs are high risk

Corrupt PEPs rarely hold assets in their own name. Family members and close associates are frequently used as nominees: holding assets, accounts, and companies on behalf of the PEP to obscure the true beneficial owner. Some of the largest financial crime cases in history have involved PEP funds held through RCA structures:

πŸ“‹ Case study The 1MDB scandal: Malaysia

The US Department of Justice alleged that, between 2009 and 2015, more than $4.5 billion belonging to 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) was misappropriated by senior officials and their associates. Funds were channelled through a network of shell companies, with associates and family members of senior Malaysian officials used as beneficial owners of accounts and entities across multiple jurisdictions.

Goldman Sachs, among other institutions, paid billions in penalties for its role in facilitating 1MDB bond issuances without adequate due diligence on beneficial ownership and source of funds.

Lesson: RCA screening is not optional. Where a customer is an RCA of a known PEP, EDD including source of funds and source of wealth must be applied with the same rigour as for the PEP directly.
πŸ” Screen PEPs and their associates
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Try searching "Rotenberg" or "Sechin" to see how Russian oligarchs connected to PEPs appear in screening results.
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Section 05

How long does PEP status last?

PEP status does not end the moment an individual leaves public office, at least not for the PEP themselves. FATF Recommendation 12 and MLR 2017 both provide for continued treatment for a period after leaving office. But the rule works differently for the former PEP than it does for their family members and known close associates (RCAs), a distinction the table below sets out.

The 12-month minimum

Where a person is no longer entrusted with the prominent public function that made them a PEP, Regulation 35(9) requires the relevant person to continue applying the requirements in paragraphs (5) and (8). Paragraph (a) sets a minimum period of at least 12 months. Paragraph (b) requires continuation for any longer period considered appropriate to address the relevant money laundering or terrorist financing risks.

PeriodStatusEDD required?Notes
While in officeActive PEPYes, mandatoryFull PEP obligations apply
0-12 months after leavingFormer PEPYes, mandatoryTreat same as active PEP
12+ months after leavingFormer PEPRisk-basedMust assess whether risk remains elevated
Long-term former PEPsFormer PEPMay not be requiredDocument rationale for reducing measures
RCAs, once the PEP leaves officeFamily member / known close associateNo longer requiredRegulation 35(11) stops RCA-specific measures immediately, regardless of the 12-month period in 35(9)
πŸ’‘
FG25/3: documenting de-escalation
Under Regulation 35(9)(b) and the FCA's July 2025 FG25/3 guidance, firms must document their reasoning when they continue the Regulation 35(5)/(8) measures beyond the 12-month minimum. FG25/3 does not state an equivalent specific requirement for ending those measures after the minimum period, though its broader expectations concerning documented PEP risk assessments and EDD decisions still apply. A bare assertion that "12 months have passed" is not sufficient either way: firms must consider whether the individual's profile, wealth, and activities suggest residual PEP risk. Senior political figures who remain active in public life may retain elevated risk for years after leaving formal office. This documentation point applies to the former PEP's own de-escalation assessment under 35(9); it does not extend to RCA measures, which stop under Regulation 35(11) regardless of documentation.
Section 06

FCA Guidance FG25/3: the July 2025 landmark

The FCA's Finalised Guidance FG25/3, published in July 2025, represents the most significant update to PEP compliance expectations in the UK since the MLR 2017. It followed a statutory review of the domestic PEP provisions and addressed industry concerns that UK domestic PEPs were being treated with the same level of scrutiny as high-risk foreign officials, disproportionate to their actual risk.

Key changes under FG25/3

  • Domestic PEPs are generally lower risk: UK PEPs should not automatically receive the same treatment as foreign PEPs. Risk must be assessed individually.
  • MLRO sign off not required automatically: The MLRO need not personally approve each relationship involving a PEP, family member or known close associate. Approval must come from a person who meets the statutory senior management test. The MLRO must remain aware of PEPs onboarded or rejected and ensure that the firm's overall PEP controls comply with the Regulations, FCA guidance and the Consumer Duty.
  • Former PEP documentation: FG25/3 expects firms to document their rationale when continuing the Regulation 35(5) and (8) measures beyond 12 months under Regulation 35(9)(b). The guidance does not state an equivalent specific requirement for ending those measures after the minimum period, although its broader expectations concerning documented PEP risk assessments and EDD decisions still apply.
  • Proportionality emphasis: Enhanced measures must be proportionate to the actual risk presented by the specific individual, not applied mechanically.
πŸ†•
FG25/3: practical impact for firms
Under FG25/3, firms should review their PEP policies to ensure domestic PEPs are not automatically treated as high risk without assessment. UK MPs, civil servants, and military officials should be assessed individually rather than receiving blanket EDD. Firms should update their PEP risk methodology and retrain staff who may have been applying a "PEP = always EDD" rule of thumb.
Section 07

Who is NOT a PEP: common mistakes

FG25/3 provides important clarification on individuals who do not meet the PEP threshold. Getting this right reduces unnecessary burden on customers and staff while maintaining focus on genuine risks.

RolePEP?Reason
Non-executive board members of UK government departments❌ NoNo executive power over public funds
Junior civil servants (below senior grade)❌ NoInsufficient prominence/power
Junior military officers❌ NoNot "senior" under MLR 2017
Local councillors❌ NoFG25/3 excludes local government roles from the PEP definition categorically, regardless of seniority within it
MPs (UK)βœ… YesLegislators: senior political function
Cabinet ministersβœ… YesSenior government function
Permanent secretariesβœ… YesMost senior civil service grade
FCA Chief Executiveβœ… YesSenior executive of public body
Bank of England Governorβœ… YesSenior official of public body
Foreign head of stateβœ… Yes, high riskMandatory EDD regardless of risk assessment
🧠 Knowledge check
Under FG25/3, a customer reveals they are a non-executive board member of the Department for Transport. Should they be treated as a PEP?
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FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is a local councillor a PEP? +
No. FG25/3 is explicit that local councillors, however senior or powerful within local government, do not meet the PEP definition, this is a categorical exclusion, not a risk-based judgement call. A councillor who chairs a major metropolitan authority's finance committee and controls significant public procurement may still present a higher-risk customer profile for other reasons, source of wealth concerns, adverse media, sanctions exposure, but that risk should be managed through ordinary risk-based CDD and EDD triggers, not by treating them as a PEP. Firms should not apply their own judgement to expand the statutory PEP category to cover local government roles.
Does PEP status apply to candidates for political office who haven't been elected yet? +
No. PEP status is triggered by being "entrusted with a prominent public function," not by standing for election. A candidate who has not yet taken office is not yet a PEP. However, firms with existing relationships should have processes to identify when a customer takes up a qualifying position, for example, following a general election. Ongoing monitoring should include triggers for customers who stand for and win political office.
What if a customer doesn't know they are connected to a PEP? +
This is a common scenario, particularly for RCAs. A customer may genuinely not know that their business partner or family member qualifies as a PEP. The firm's obligation is to conduct reasonable screening and due diligence: if the connection emerges, EDD must be applied regardless of whether the customer was aware. Customer self-declaration should not be the sole method of identifying PEP connections: it must be supplemented by database screening and public information checks.
How do we handle PEPs from countries with weak governance or high corruption? +
All foreign PEPs require EDD, but the depth and focus of that EDD should reflect the specific risk. Two different, non-interchangeable signals are relevant here: Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index measures perceived public-sector corruption directly, while FATF grey and black list status measures a jurisdiction's AML/CFT regime deficiencies, not corruption as such, though the two often correlate in practice. For PEPs connected to jurisdictions flagged by either measure, firms should apply more intensive source of wealth scrutiny, consider whether the relationship can be adequately managed, seek senior management approval at a higher level than usual, and apply more frequent ongoing monitoring. The FCA expects firms to calibrate EDD to actual risk, not to apply a one-size-fits-all approach regardless of jurisdiction.
Do PEP obligations apply to business customers as well as individuals? +
Yes, indirectly. Where a legal entity customer has a PEP as a beneficial owner, director, or significant controller, PEP obligations apply to that relationship. This is why beneficial ownership identification is so critical: it is not enough to screen the entity name; you must identify and screen the individuals behind it. This is particularly relevant for companies from high-risk jurisdictions where PEPs frequently use corporate structures to hold assets.